The world media is fixated on Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his rogue plan to develop nuclear technology. But journalists have missed a significant story coming from inside Iran, one that may ultimately affect the stability and longevity of Mr. Ahmadinejad's regime.

Anxious to cultivate his populist image, Iran's new President has promised to hold his monthly Cabinet sessions in provincial capitals rather than Tehran. Now, however, it seems he may not be able to take his roadshow to all 30 provinces -- apparently, because of feared security threats in areas where there are significant numbers of non-Persians.

A session scheduled to take place in the Kurdish province of Kurdistan last month had to be rescheduled at the last minute, supposedly because the relevant documents were not ready in time. And last week, the President was forced to cancel another session, due to take place in Ahvaz, capital of the largely Arab Khuzistan province, ostensibly because of bad weather.

In both cases, the official explanations are likely untrue.

Kurdistan has been a scene of sporadic anti-government demonstrations since last June. At least 40 people have reportedly died in clashes with the security forces while more than 700 have been arrested. The authorities have also closed down a number of Kurdish-language publications, despite Ahmadinejad's promise to permit a free press.

Ahvaz, for its part, has witnessed a series of deadly bomb attacks and terrorist operations during the past four months, with several clandestine organizations calling on the province's ethnic Arabs to revolt against Ahmadinejad's "repressive policies."

Iranian Kurds number around six million, or some 9% of the population. The last time they were seduced on a large scale by ethnic politics was in the mid-1940s when, with Stalin's help, they set up a "republic" in the city of Mahabad. The entity folded after one year, and nine of its 12 leaders were hanged in public. But its memory continues to inspire a small but determined number of Iranian Kurds who feel they are getting a bad deal from the Khomeinist ruling elite in Tehran.

As for Arabs, they number some three million, or about 4% of the population. At least half live in Khuzistan, with others scattered in four provinces stretched along the Gulf.

Unlike the Kurds, Iran's Arabs do not have any secessionist history. On the contrary, they emerged as the most ardent defenders of Iran's unity in the 1940s, when the Soviet Union was busy promoting secessionism. Bound to the majority of Iranians by their Shiite faith and a long history of intermarriage, the Khuzistan Arabs also played a leading role in the petro-nationalization movement of the 1950s and, later, in defending Iran against Saddam Hussein's invading armies in the 1980s.

During the Khomeinist revolution of 1978-79, both ethnic Kurds and Arabs stayed largely on the sidelines. The Kurds, a majority of whom are Sunni Muslims, were wary of a regime headed by Shiite mullahs. The Arabs, on the other hand, feared that a theocracy might try to curtain the individual and social freedoms that Khuzistan, one of Iran's most advanced provinces, had built over the decades.

After an initial series of local revolts, all brutally crushed, the Kurds resigned themselves to life under the Khomeinist regime. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Tehran managed to decapitate the Kurdish political leadership through a series of assassinations inside and outside Iran.

In the past few years, however, Iran's Kurdish-majority areas have witnessed an upsurge of political activity. One reason is the liberation of Iraq and the leading role that Iraqi Kurds have assumed in the new, democratic Iraqi system. Another reason is Ahmadinejad's Shiite extremism, including his avowed devotion to the Shiite cult of the "Hidden Imam." The Kurds regard such doctrines as un-Islamic and fear they may be used as a pretext for attacks against their own religious beliefs and culture.

Ahmadinejad would be wrong to dismiss the threat of ethnic dissent in the Islamic Republic. Located along the country's long and porous borders, these communities could be open to manipulation by anyone who wishes to weaken Iran or pay back Tehran for meddling in neighbouring countries.

Political expediency, therefore -- not to mention justice and human rights -- require that he should pay attention to the legitimate grievances of Iran's ethnic minorities. It took Turkey some 30 years of war to understand that it cannot force its Kurdish minority to abandon their identity and become ersatz Turks. It has taken Iraq almost 80 years of tragic experiments to recognize the Kurds as a distinct people deserving full cultural and national rights. Tehran must do the same. In the long run, Iran's unity will only be preserved through a recognition of its diversity.

In the meantime, Western nations should think twice before playing the ethnic and sectarian cards against Ahmadinejad, even through covert channels. Any attempt at encouraging secessionism in the Iranian periphery would only mobilize the mainstream nationalism of Iranians in support of a regime that has lost much of its original support base, and which may eventually fall from within.

Even if successful, a campaign to break up Iran would be a dangerous experiment. A Yugoslav-style scenario -- of the sort the Americans are desperately trying to avoid in Iraq -- could unleash dark forces of nationalism and religious zealotry that could plunge the entire region into years, if not decades, of bloody crises.

Ahmadinejad is a monster who feeds on external conflict. The answer is not to lead him to a banquet table, but to let him gradually starve.

Iranian author Amir Taheri is a member of Benador Associates.

© National Post 2006