What makes a failed state? Examples such as Somalia, Yemen, Afghanistan and Sudan would suggest poverty, political instability, ethnic or religious cleavages, or a lack of central government.

Yet none of these factors are at the heart of Tunisia’s troubles. Once a model of Arab modernism and secularism, a series of terrorist attacks by Islamic fundamentalists has threatened the very state itself. In the words of Tunisian President Beji Caid Essebsi, “if such incidents happen again, the state will collapse.” He declared a state of emergency on Saturday.

With the spiralling trajectory of Arab politics in the Middle East, it is difficult not to see Tunisia as a major surprise — indicative of the region’s state of flux, revolution and unpredictability. Though not entirely insulated from the historical background of neighbouring Algeria and Libya, Tunisia has long and rightfully been reputed as a modern, Westernized state. Common indices such as the prevalence of Western dress, popular and official contempt for the female head covering, and favourable relations with Europe and the United States would make Tunisia a quintessential case of Arab modernism.

Due to these factors, one could have afforded Tunisia the best of expectations for democratic transition. It was in Tunisia itself that the Arab Spring began, with its demonstrations causing President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali to flee the country. Since its revolution, the country has managed to maintain its character in contrast to the division, violence and Islamic extremism present in Libya and in Egypt. The Tunisian left competes well with the moderate Islamists, and the country possesses institutions of civil society, representing such interests as human rights, commerce, law and organized labour. Its constitution stipulates that a number of seats in city and district governments be given to female representatives. And while it recognizes Islam, it does not define the sharia as a legal source.

In addition to its secularism, Tunisia’s ethnic and religious homogeneity, its small military’s disinterest in political power and its constitutional basis in the rule of law and democracy give it advantages over other Arab states.

And yet it now seems as though the factors that once made Tunisia a small, stable and secure country have begun to work against it. The jihadist forces are exploiting the country’s reliance on foreign tourism in an attempt to cripple the state. Tunisia’s small military, previously unencumbered, now faces an Islamist insurgency from the west.

One should not exclude present cynicism toward the region in this story. What was once a potent enthusiasm, particularly in Europe, toward the optimistic Arab Spring has expired into pessimism about a hopeless Arab Winter. It is doubtless that a series of similar attacks in 2011 would have motivated a movement of empathy and solidarity with Tunisians, and thus greater demands on Western leaders to assist. Moreover, the help that Tunisia might otherwise find may not be available: having engaged in more strikes against the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant this weekend, and with its pending nuclear deal with Iran, the United States is spread thin in the Middle East.

The extreme Islamists are therefore striking with a skillful strategy, at a time of weakness for the Tunisian state and people. Though our sympathies should certainly extend to anyone in the grasp of such barbarism, the history and character of Tunisia should make this prospect especially concerning. If Tunisia does fall, it will represent the failure of the best opportunity for democracy in the Arab World. What this portends for the rest of the region cannot possibly be good.