As the U.S. military community grapples with what seasoned officers are calling the failure of the counter-insurgency campaign in Afghanistan, Canada's top soldier in that country is labelling the strategy a success.

Karl Eikenberry, the former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan and a commanding general of forces there from 2005 to 2007, has published a scathing critique of the counterinsurgency doctrine, known by its military acronym as COIN, in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs magazine.

West Point professor Col. Isaiah Wilson III, who worked on the U.S. Afghan strategy, also writes in the new issue of the American Interest magazine about concerns over the failure of COIN in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

The counter-insurgency doctrine was adopted by the U.S., Canada and other countries, and stressed the need to protect civilian populations, eliminate insurgent leaders and help establish a legitimate government that could deliver services to its people. "In short, COIN failed in Afghanistan," Eikenberry wrote.

But Maj.-Gen. Dean Milner, the most senior Canadian officer in Afghanistan, counters that isn't the case. "I've seen tremendous improvement over the last couple of years and I continue to see it," Milner said Wednesday in a phone interview from Kabul. "I think the counterinsurgency strategy may have been employed a little later than we would have liked, but in essence I think it's moved this country in the right direction.

"The bottom line is that I actually think, for the most part, the situation continues to improve," Milner said.

The debate over the counterinsurgency doctrine comes as U.S. forces continue their withdrawal from Afghanistan with an eye to winding down combat operations by 2014. Questions are being raised in the U.S. whether the costly war will accomplish anything in the long term or whether the Taliban will return to power once western troops leave.

Canada, which has about 800 military personnel in Afghanistan, is also pulling out its forces. All Canadians will be home by the end of March 2014, Milner said.

In his critique, Eikenberry questioned the COIN doctrine's principles. He noted that the strategy talks about the need to protect the local population, which coalition forces did, at least from the Taliban.

"But what about criminal narcotraffickers, venal local police chiefs, or predatory government officials?" Eikenberry asked.

He also questioned the assumption that U.S. military personnel without the appropriate language skills and only a superficial understanding of Afghan culture could bring development to Afghan villages.

"The typical 21-year-old Marine is hard-pressed to win the heart and mind of his mother-in-law; can he really be expected to do the same with an ethnocentric Pashtun tribal elder?" Eikenberry wrote.

He also warned that Afghanistan is too reliant on foreign countries for financial support. In recent years, the U.S. and other donors have paid for 90 per cent of Afghanistan's total public expenditures, including for security forces.

Milner confirmed that Canada intends to provide financial support for Afghanistan after the 2014 pullout.

Milner said the first phase of the Canadian withdrawal will take place in October when the number of personnel drops from around 800 to about 650. The personnel are currently training Afghan security forces.

By Christmas, the number will drop to about 375 and by January there will be fewer than 100 Canadian personnel in Afghanistan. The Canadian military has been involved in Afghanistan since late 2001. One hundred and fifty eight Canadian Forces personnel have died and more than 1,800 have been injured.

In July 2011, the Canadian Forces ended its combat mission in Kandahar province and focused on training Afghan security forces.