The arrest of radical cleric Abu Bakar Bashir could be a turning point in Indonesia's fight against terrorism.
The arrest this week of Indonesian cleric Abu Bakar Bashir is significant not just because it is the culmination of vigorous investigations into terror groups. It also could be a turning point in convincing the country's moderate Muslim majority to stop offering support to Bashir and his jihadist followers.
Bashir's arrest on terrorism charges came as little surprise to anyone. Over the past four months, police arrested members of his Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid organization and charged them with terrorist offenses, particularly involvement in the so-called "al Qaeda in Aceh" cell. This group shot dead three mobile brigade officers during a police raid in February and reportedly planned attacks on the Indonesian president, the national police headquarters, foreign embassies and five-star hotels. Following those arrests, Bashir declared that he too expected to be interrogated.
The real news about the arrest is the quality and quantity of the evidence that the police appear to have against Bashir. The Indonesian authorities claim to have proof that Bashir directly funded the Aceh cell, appointed its leadership and advised cell members on operational matters. Included in this evidence are statements from JAT members who witnessed Bashir giving cash to the terrorists. Bashir has denied all the accusations and refused to answer any questions during his police interrogation.
If the police claims are true, then Bashir has been far less careful than in the past. For many years, he avoided incriminating behavior and maintained a cloak of deniability should any of his followers be implicated in violent activity.
Bashir served as emir of Jemaah Islamiya, then Southeast Asia's largest and most lethal jihadist organization, from 1999 to 2002. During this time, he approved the operation which led to the Bali bombing of 2002, resulting in the deaths of 202 people. But he did so obliquely. When the would-be bombers approached him vaguely stating their wish to conduct jihad in Bali, he reportedly gave his assent without asking for details of what was planned. This enabled him to later state that he did not know his followers planned a massive bomb attack, nor did he endorse it, but he upheld their right to carry out jihad as they saw fit. Bashir was eventually found guilty of conspiracy relating to the bombing and sentenced to two years' imprisonment.
On several occasions, Bashir has told journalists that the Bali bombers misunderstood the principles of jihad, but that they would nonetheless go to heaven as martyrs, whereas their non-Muslim victims were condemned to hell. This double-edged casuistry became a hallmark of his public utterances on terrorism, allowing him both to assert his supposed personal objection to the attacks but also to give support to those who undertook them. Bashir's lack of direct knowledge of bombing operations was one reason why he twice escaped with short jail terms after being tried for terrorism-related offences.
One intriguing question, if the new allegations against him are true, is why Bashir took such risks over the past year by directly involving himself in terrorist activities. After his release from jail in 2006, he strove to broaden his mainstream appeal. He founded JAT in 2008 ostensibly as a vehicle to popularize both himself and his campaign for Shariah law. By engaging in terrorism, he risked destroying his own standing and that of JAT.
One possible answer is that Bashir was angered by what he saw as increasingly brutal state retaliation against jihadists. He condemned the execution of the three Bali bombers in November 2008 and denounced the shooting dead by police of leading jihadists such as Noordin Top and Saifuddin Jailani in 2009. It may be that Bashir felt compelled to initiate new terrorist activity in response to greater police violence, regardless of the attendant risks of arrest and conviction. It is also possible that Bashir, who is now almost 72, hoped that the Aceh cell might succeed in establishing a Shariah enclave or mini Islamic state in Aceh, of which he could serve as emir—seemingly one of his long-cherished goals.
The new case against Bashir is likely to result in a far stiffer sentence than previous trials. In those cases, prosecutors appeared half-hearted and poorly prepared. This time the evidence arrayed against him much stronger, and the government appears determined to prosecute the matter rigorously. In part this may be due to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's own preoccupation with the Aceh cell's plans to assassinate him.
The successful prosecution of Bashir is critical to Indonesia's counter-terrorism campaign. He not only has far greater public stature than any other conservative Islamic leader, but has also embodied the ambivalence that many Indonesian Muslims have felt about the terrorism issue.
While disagreeing with many of Bashir's radical views, mainstream Muslims have nonetheless seen him as a victim of powerful anti-Islamic forces, both domestic and foreign. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Suharto regime imprisoned Bashir after a sedition trial that many Indonesians believe was rigged.
When a newly democratic Indonesian government put Bashir on trial in 2003 and again in 2005, many believed that the prosecutions were again politically motivated, this time due to Western pressure. In one of the trials, a former U.S. government translator testified about meetings in which American officials pressed President Megawati Sukarnoputri to arrest Bashir.
Added to this was the widely held view that Bashir neither looked nor spoke like a terrorist, particularly when compared to firebrands such as Bali bombers. Hence, the Muslim community has tended to give him the benefit of the doubt.
If prosecutors can show convincingly in court that Bashir did indeed instigate terrorist activity, then a major remaining source of skepticism about the integrity of Indonesia's counter-terrorism effort will be removed. The mainstream religious leaders who have made supportive remarks about Bashir in recent years will be forced to reconsider their views. That would further strengthen mounting public hostility toward terrorists and increase political support for tough action.
Mr. Fealy is a senior lecturer and fellow in Indonesian politics at the College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University.
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