IDF to head into next Lebanon war with more firepower, upgraded capabilities

Part 2 of article

The Scud missiles which Hezbollah reportedly received from Syria are meant for a specific objective. Should it indeed turn out that the missiles smuggled in are of the Scud D type, this is apparently a threat on Israel's nuclear reactor in Dimona.

As far as is known, Nasrallah's group does not have plans to take over areas in the Galilee. It may have the ability to raid a community, in order to produce drama, yet its war will focus on firing rockets and missiles deep into Israel, over time. For that reason, most of its fortifications aim to protect and feed its strategic arm.

This protection is premised on roughly 160 military compounds established in southern Lebanon, in villages and in their vicinity, including in Christian enclaves. For that reason, when the IDF held drills it referred to the communities as military compounds in every way. For a change, the army will head into the next war in Lebanon with a plan that had already been practiced.

Hezbollah started the process of drawing lessons in the wake of the Second Lebanon War, and updated them following Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. The operation in the south in 2008-9 demonstrated to an even greater extent than in 2006 the grave results of the IDF's so-called "Dahiya Doctrine" – Nasrallah realizes that today the IDF is in a whole new place, both in terms of maneuvering and firepower.

For this reason, Hezbollah (as well as Hamas) is rapidly digging up fortifications underground – bunkers, headquarters, control centers, and passage ways from one sector to another.

In order to direct coordinated fire at the same target, one needs a much more advanced command and control system than the one possessed by Hezbollah thus far. Here, in fact, lies its vulnerability. On the one hand, it's hard to cope with a terror group that conducts itself like an army. On the other hand, Hezbollah is already suffering all the problems of an institutionalized military organization; problems which small and secretive guerilla cells are not afflicted with.

In the Second Lebanon War, the Air Force destroyed Hezbollah's long-range missiles within 35 minutes. Meanwhile, 50% of the rockets fired from industrialized short and mid range rocket launchers were destroyed before they were used, while the rest were destroyed immediately after the first attack. We can assume that the Israeli Air Force's and ground forces' abilities in terms of accurate weaponry and hitting such targets have improved since then, by several notches.

Hezbollah's dream is to maintain an army of at least 40,000 men, Today it has less than half of that, and the increase it aspires for requires compromise on manpower quality. Moreover, advanced weapons systems require strict maintenance and high technological capabilities. This is no longer a case of fighting with your Kalashnikov or RPG.

In the next war, UNIFIL will not be in south Lebanon. Its members will leave when the war breaks out, even if they're not saying this right now. UNIFIL does not have the mandate to interfere in the fighting, and it certainly has an interest in safeguarding its soldiers' lives.

On another front, the 15,000 troops of the Lebanese Army deployed south of the Litani River do not constitute a target for the IDF at this time. However, this army is expected to put up a fight once a war breaks out. Based on this logic, the IDF will be addressing this army as a hostile force. In other words, any clash that includes IDF ground movement in Lebanon will have to push aside and neutralize these 15,000 troops as quickly as possible.

Nasrallah is apparently unconvinced that his group has reached the optimal point to embark on war. He possesses endless amounts of rockets, yet not many accurate and long-range missiles. We can assume that once he accumulates a sufficient arsenal, the countdown shall begin. The fire will only be a matter of time.

And this is precisely the place to ask what Israel's government is doing so that these balance-violating weapons won't continue to pour into Hezbollah's hands, and whether the convoys that cross the Syria-Lebanon border should continue to enjoy impunity under UN Resolution 1701.

as28-c Copyright © Yedioth Internet. All rights reserved.