What strikes the reader of "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy" is the determination of its authors, Professors Stephen Walt of Harvard and John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago, to systematically attack every possible aspect of the U.S.-Israeli alliance.

They leave no stone unturned: They start with the assertion that since the end of Cold War, Israel is definitely not a strategic asset of the United States (and perhaps never was), then they move to the "dwindling" of Israel's moral case, and that sets up their conclusion that what ultimately sustains this relationship is the work of the "Israel Lobby," which in their view is clearly not operating to advance American interests.

It is not difficult to challenge or even refute much of this analysis, although it reflects the views of a certain portion of academia today. On the strategic side, no two countries have identical interests; nevertheless, despite the fact that Israel's main threat during the Cold War came from Arab states and the main American concern was the USSR, the two states worked closely together. Indeed, the New York Times reported in 1986 that the head of U.S. Air Force intelligence acknowledged that America could not have obtained the same intelligence as it received from Israel "with five CIAs."

The problem is that this information is generally held in classified channels, making it difficult for academics like Walt and Mearsheimer to provide a reliable assessment of the U.S.-Israeli relationship.

One thing that can be said is that with the end of the Cold War, the gap in the threats that both countries face has disappeared. They both must contend with rogue states in the Middle East seeking weapons of mass destruction and using international terrorism as an instrument to advance their national interests.

For that reason, U.S. military commanders such as General Bantz J. Craddock, the U.S. European commander, could state before the House Armed Services Committee on March 15, 2007: "In the Middle East, Israel is the U.S.'s closest ally and directly supports our interests. . ." Both countries still hold joint air, ground and naval exercises - which have come to be in the interest of other NATO countries as well.

The "dwindling moral case" advanced by Walt and Mearsheimer would probably fire up Israeli readers most, because of the Palestinian issue. Israelis gave peace a chance and paid a huge price; they agreed in the 1993 Oslo Accords to bringing Yasser Arafat and his exile leadership from Tunis to the West Bank and Gaza, and in return got a spate of suicide bombing attacks that emanated from the very cities Israel turned over to the PLO.

Over a thousand Israelis were killed. In 2005, Israel nonetheless unilaterally pulled out of the Gaza Strip, hoping that the Palestinians and the international community would help create a "Dubai on the Mediterranean." Instead, in early 2006 Hamas won the Palestinian elections. It intensified rocket attacks on southern Israel and Gaza came to resemble Mogadishu. Why should Israel feel a moral burden under these circumstances?

The puzzle about Walt and Mearsheimer, who are known to be among America's finest political scientists, is that they probably know these basic facts but still decided on their hostile narrative.

Two events are at the heart of the American foreign policy debate today, and both probably lay at the root of the intensity of the criticism mounted by the two academics: the 9/11 attack and the Iraq war.

Walt and Mearsheimer share a belief with other observers who seek to identify Western support for Israel as the root cause of the radical Islamic rage that led to Al Qaeda and its attacks. By this argument, if the West lowered its support for Israel or obtained deep Israeli territorial withdrawals, that would lower the flames of radical Islamic rage.

History, of course, does not support this analysis. Al Qaeda was not formed in response to any Arab-Israeli War, but to the Soviet invasion of and withdrawal from Afghanistan. It saw itself replicating the victories of 7th century Islam against the great powers of the time, Byzantium and Persia. Its goals were global.

And when Israel did pursue a conciliatory policy with the Oslo peace process from 1993 to 2000, the rage of Al Qaeda was not calmed; its attacks intensified from Saudi Arabia in 1995, to East Africa in 1998, to Yemen in 2000 and finally to New York and Washington. There simply was no correlation between Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy and the attacks of Al Qaeda.

But it is Iraq that angers Walt and Mearsheimer most. Coming from the "realist" school of international relations, they cannot explain how the Bush administration got itself into this quagmire. Their explanation is to look at the influence of Israel as a "critical element" behind the decision to go to war.

Yet there is another well-documented view. In his book "Plan of Attack," Washington Post writer Bob Woodward details a conversation between the Saudi ambassador to Washington, Prince Bandar, and President George W. Bush, in which the Saudi envoy seeks to get Bush to finish off what his father began in 1991. Richard Clarke, who served in the White House before the Iraq war, also recalls in his memoir that "a concern with the long-term stability of the House of Saud" underpinned U.S. decision-making in 2003. But the Saudi factor is not seriously taken into consideration by Walt and Mearsheimer.

The Iraq war has been a trauma for many Americans and it has unleashed a bitter partisan debate in Washington. Walt and Mearsheimer have found a bogeyman to blame. It is a careless and dangerous assertion, not unlike looking for who poisoned the wells during the Black Death.

Lobbies have been around for decades in Washington in domestic and foreign affairs. In the case of Israel and the United States, real interests and shared values are the true glue bonding the two countries.

It would be a shame if the U.S.-Israel relationship becomes another casualty of one of the most difficult wars that America has had to fight.

Copyright International Herald Tribune 2007