For Israelis, a public handshake with Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal in Damascus sealed Jimmy Carter's fate.

In spite of Mr. Carter's well-intentioned peace mission, he was seen in Jerusalem as the wrong man at the wrong time. The former president, who successfully brokered Israel's peace with Egypt three decades ago, was shunned by the country's senior leaders and widely attacked by the media. More than any other prominent U.S. political figure, Mr. Carter gets under Israelis' skin.

On the one hand, Mr. Carter's signal contribution to the cause of Arab-Israeli peace can't be ignored. The historic peace treaty, which profoundly improved Israel's strategic position in the region and laid the groundwork for later Israeli-Palestinian talks, gained him the trust of prime minister Menachem Begin and other Israelis. In recent years, however, Mr. Carter has managed to alienate Israeli doves and hawks alike through relentless, one-sided criticism that's both inaccurate and counterproductive.

It's one thing to challenge the military's practices in the West Bank and Gaza, to oppose Jewish settlements in the territories occupied since 1967, and to call for their evacuation - as many Israelis do. But it's egregiously wrong to argue that such practices are the same as or worse than South Africa's former apartheid policies; that Israel is guilty of the worst human-rights deprivations today; that its actions are the primary cause of Palestinian violence.

When Mr. Carter put these views on the record in his 2006 book, Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid , he lost the trust of most Israelis and North American Jews.

Nothing unnerves Israelis right across the political spectrum more than the comparison to South Africa, which is based more in rhetoric than in fact. Calling Israel an "apartheid state" is a familiar rallying cry for those who question the state's very legitimacy.

It's this duality in Mr. Carter, who defies clear "friend or foe" categories, that's the lightning rod for a visceral, understandably negative reaction. Mr. Carter has denied himself the capacity to be the kind of constructive mediator he once was and claims he wants to be - and there's no way to recover.

By coming to the region the way he did, the uninvited messenger carried a problematic message. The issue goes beyond his opinion that Israel should unconditionally talk to Hamas. In fact, a growing number of former Israeli military and security figures also believe that, for pragmatic reasons, Hamas should be engaged. (And I agree.) But given the international legitimacy the terrorist organization craves, the manner in which this is done is critical. A high-profile meeting between a former U.S. president and Hamas leader Meshaal only undermines the efforts of those Israelis who actually agree with Mr. Carter on substance.

Formally, Israel, the United States and the European Union all refuse to talk to Hamas unless it recognizes Israel, accepts existing Israeli-Palestinian agreements and desists from violence. But rhetoric aside, Israel recognizes that there's no purely military solution to the ongoing rocket attacks from Gaza, and that it can't indefinitely block supplies to the one million Palestinians living there. Besides, it's going to be difficult to reach any meaningful agreement with Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas as long as Hamas controls Gaza. Finally, there's the unclear fate of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, who's been held captive in Gaza for 22 months.

To somehow deal with this complex web, the Israeli government has been quietly and gingerly exploring options for a ceasefire through Egyptian offices, and these may now be showing some signs of success.

This wouldn't entail any direct talks with Hamas, could stabilize the situation along Gaza's border with Israel and perhaps lead to Mr. Shalit's release - all in the painful knowledge that no matter how any understandings are positioned, Hamas will use a ceasefire to weaken Mr. Abbas's position.

At this fragile moment in this process, Mr. Carter comes on the scene, more a meddler than a mediator - and what did (and didn't) happen in Jerusalem was an appropriate reflection of this perception. Israeli President Shimon Peres, a Nobel laureate, met with him out of respect for past achievements, while the executive level of government - Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, along with the defence minister and foreign minister - declined to do so.

For all that, Mr. Carter may have made a small difference on two counts: His presence reminded Israelis that military prowess alone isn't the answer, even against Hamas. He also may have scored an important humanitarian gesture. If Hamas actually releases the letter from Mr. Shalit that Mr. Carter says he was promised, the unwelcome visitor may get a grudging nod, even from those who have turned their backs on him.

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