The saying goes that the Arabs can't make war without Egypt, but there can't be peace without Syria

For the first time in years, the possibility of Israel returning the Golan Heights to its arch-enemy, Syria, has made an unexpected comeback. Syrian President Bashar Assad announced last week that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert had assured him that Israel was willing to withdraw from the occupied plateau, in exchange for a peace treaty. Coming after Israel's military assault on an apparent nuclear reactor in northeastern Syria in September and the assassination of a leading Hezbollah figure in the streets of Damascus in February, many were surprised that the confrontational attitude of the two countries had so quickly changed.

They shouldn't have been. The makings of a deal have been in place for more than a decade.

When Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated in 1995, few people knew just how close he was to a peace treaty with Syria. Even his successor, foreign minister Shimon Peres, is said not to have known quite how far the Israeli leader had been prepared to move to achieve a breakthrough.

And move is the operative word.

As Mr. Peres learned when he read the files on the day of Mr. Rabin's funeral, the late prime minister had been willing to withdraw Israeli forces and civilians from the entire Golan Heights, the towering ridge and plateau captured in the 1967 Six Day War, and home to thousands of Israeli settlers. Such a move had long been Syria's sine qua non for any peace negotiations.

"Unthinkable" was the common reaction in Israel. After all, Israelis had been taught since elementary school that this strategically important ridge could never be returned.

But that wasn't always the way the map of the Middle East had been drawn. When the state of Israel was born, 60 years ago this month, the boundaries between the Jewish and Arab communities inside Palestine were unclear and would be settled by fighting that raged for the next year. However, the boundary between the French mandate of Syria and the British mandate of Palestine, had been decided in 1923 when the League of Nations carved up Ottoman territory. The Golan Heights fell entirely within Syria, and the Sea of Galilee, at their foot, fell entirely within Palestine.

While Syria rushed in troops to assist the Palestinian Arabs, the line between Syria and what became Israel was not in doubt, and the 1949 armistice largely confirmed it. And so it remained, until 1967. In the war that broke out that year between Israel and the Arab states of Egypt, Jordan and Syria, Israel, in short order, conquered the Sinai and Gaza from Egypt, the west bank of the Jordan River from Jordan and the Golan Heights from Syria.

Egypt's and Syria's attempt to regain their territories in the 1973 war failed. And though Egypt's Anwar Sadat later recognized Israel's legitimacy and recovered the Sinai, Syria refused to do likewise.

But Israel and Syria did not remain in open conflict. The ceasefire line drawn at the eastern edge of the Golan has been the very quietest of Israel's frontiers since Henry Kissinger negotiated an agreement in 1974. The issue of territory did not, however, fade from view.

THE PLATEAU AND THE LAKE

There's an enormous raised-relief wall map in the office of the director of Syria's Ministry of Information, on the top floor of Baath Party headquarters in Damascus. The area of Israel's occupation is painted in bright red. Since 1967, Syria has never wavered on its demand for the return of the territory Israel conquered.

For its part, Israel has always insisted on Syria's agreeing to full peace as a condition for even talking about any return.

But despite the popular mantra about never yielding the strategic heights, Israel has pretty well always been willing to return the Golan to Syria under certain terms.

As Itamar Rabinovich, Israel's chief negotiator with Syria from 1992 to 1996, noted in his book The Brink of Peace , Moshe Dayan, the defence minister during the 1967 war, hadn't wanted to capture the heights. In The Story of My Life , Mr. Dayan expressed his worry about the "long-term consequences. The Syrians would not accept our permanent presence on the Golan Heights and we would be in a state of war with three Arab states."

Persuaded to take the heights, Mr. Dayan saw them as a bargaining chip to be traded for peace and a secure, recognized border.

But while Egypt and Jordan negotiated peace with Israel, and the Palestinians attempted to reach an agreement of their own, little movement has taken place between Israel and Syria, at least on the surface.

The key to breaking the logjam lies on the northeast shore of the Sea of Galilee. This normally placid body of warm water and its feeder rivers and springs form a vital part of Israel's water system. The 1923 boundary left it entirely inside Mandate Palestine, with only a 10-metre-wide shoreline on the northeast banks.

In the 1948-49 war, Syria easily captured the 10-metre-wide strip and gained access to the lake. The armistice required the area to be demilitarized and settled by neither side. But inch by inch, by 1967, Syria had regained control of it (as Israel crept into other parts of the demilitarized zone).

Syria wants to go back to the position as of June 4, 1967, the day before war broke out.

For years, Israeli leaders balked at any idea of withdrawal from the Golan. The Israelis and Syrians first publicly met during the Madrid peace conference of 1991. "[Hafez] Assad's willingness to come to the Madrid conference signified a new beginning," wrote Mr. Rabinovich. But there was little progress on the Israel-Syria track.

It is said in the Middle East that the Arabs can't make war without Egypt, but there can't be peace without Syria. That was Mr. Rabin's view. While most public attention during his time in office was focused on the Palestinian peace process, Mr. Rabin preferred to deal with the clearly defined and powerful authority in Damascus.

As early as August, 1993, Mr. Rabin was ready to agree to a pullback from the Golan giving Syria access to the Sea of Galilee, if areas on both sides of the line were demilitarized to various degrees and if Syria implemented a full peace.

He told Israelis that "the depth of withdrawal will reflect the depth of peace." In other words, full withdrawal for full peace.

The U.S. conveyed the message to Damascus, but Syria's aging president was slow to respond, and the Palestinian question took precedence for a time. However, the Syrians pocketed what Israeli historians would call the "Rabin deposit."

After Mr. Rabin's murder in 1995, Mr. Peres tried but failed to bring Mr. Assad to an agreement. And subsequent prime ministers Benjamin Netanyahu and Ehud Barak declined to offer as much as Mr. Rabin. Mr. Barak came very close in 2000 to offering a withdrawal to the June 4 line, only to back away at the last minute. Mr. Assad died a month later, still clutching the Rabin deposit.

Now, eight years later, along comes Ehud Olmert, who apparently has indicated his willingness to discuss "full withdrawal."

DRAWING ON THE DEPOSIT

There are reasons why Mr. Olmert would do this. The lack of any progress toward a peace deal with the Palestinians, and his failed attempt to defeat Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006, leave him badly in need of a victory - something to keep his precarious coalition in office and to be held up as a legacy.

As Eyal Zisser, director of the Moshe Dayan Centre at Tel Aviv University wrote on Thursday, "the Second Lebanon War should be seen as a watershed in the development of Syrian-Israeli relations."

What Bashar Assad first saw as an opportunity to threaten a weakened Israel, turned into a threat to him, as Israel carried out its brazen attack on Syria's nuclear facility, restoring its deterrent credibility. Hence, Mr. Zisser says, Mr. Assad did not retaliate, but revealed the Israeli leader's offer and the talks being carried out with the help of Turkey's Prime Minister.

A peace agreement between Israel and Syria would be nothing to sneeze at.

To Israel it would mean a recognized peaceful border not only with Syria, but also with Lebanon, which would be sure to follow; an overland passage to Europe for trucks and tourists; and the likely normalization with most, if not all, of the Arab world.

Though some Israelis hope to pry Syria away from its patron, Iran, and away from its client, Hezbollah, neither would be likely. Still, Syria's continuing influence with Hezbollah could be a good way to keep the group in line.

To Syria, a treaty would mean, above all, the return of its territory and national pride; unprecedented economic opportunity, as a conduit for regional trade; and a longed-for acceptance by the United States, which has blown hot and cold toward Damascus.

Syria isn't about to sign a treaty unless a Palestinian agreement with Israel is also forthcoming. Damascus has always insisted that such a deal was contingent on the return of all land conquered from Arabs. But rather than being an obstacle, a pending Israel-Syria agreement could be an incentive for a deal between Israel and the Palestinians. Damascus holds some sway with Hamas, and, on the right terms, Jerusalem might find a way to include Hamas in the peace process. That too could be a benefit of an Israel-Syria accord.

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