The Arab Summit Conference, held this year in Damascus, adjourned on March 30 after two days of discussions. Since 1964, Arab summits have regularly convened about once every 12-18 months (except during the 1990s, when only two were held). True, the Summit is not enshrined in the charter of the Arab League as an official, permanent institution, but over the years, these meetings have become the most important and prestigious inter-Arab institution, constituting the crown jewel and the League’s activities. In that context, the Summits have turned into a symbolic affirmation of the principle of “Arab unity.”

Precisely for that reason, this last Summit was most noteworthy for the divisions among League members, expressed in the sparse attendance of Arab leaders. 11 of the 22 invitees preferred not to come to Damascus and instead sent lower-ranking representatives. Particularly striking was the absence of leaders of key Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt. And the Government of Lebanon chose not send anyone at all. In the past, other states have boycotted summits or walked out in the middle because of differences with some participants, but they were usually marginal actors on the Arab scene. Until now, there has never been a boycott of heads of so many central Arab states. Nor has their action been so blatant and demonstrative as was the case in Damascus.

The immediate background to this situation lies in the disgust of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and their allies at Syria’s involvement in the ongoing political crisis in Lebanon. Since the end of Emile Lahoud’s term of office in November 2007, the Presidency has remained vacant. Since the governing coalition (led by the party of Sa’ad Hariri) cannot muster the quorum needed to choose a new president on the first ballot without the support of the opposition (led by Hizballah), and the two sides have no choice but to agree on a compromise candidate. But while such a candidate actually exists, in the person of Army Commander General Michel Suleiman, the opposition, with Syrian support and encouragement, has conditioned its agreement to assemble Parliament and carry out a vote on being given greater power in government. In effect, that would give it a veto over policies not to its liking. Syrian policies complicate the search for a solution to this crisis. As Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora explained on the even of the Summit, Syria “has played a central role in exacerbating the political crisis in Lebanon … and prevented the proposal of an agreed candidate for President.” Moreover, added Siniora, Syria also sabotaged the Arab League initiative to resolve the crisis.

At first glance, there would seem to be no better place to work out such this complicated problem than at a forum of Arab leaders hosted by a central actor in the Lebanese crisis. However, over the years, Arab Summits have proven themselves to be largely helpless in solving crises between Arab League members. At most, the Summits gave certificates of approval to facts on the ground or to compromises agreed directly by the parties involved. Actually, in no significant crisis over the past few decades have summit meetings played a decisive role in the search for solutions. Summits are therefore largely ceremonial events which confer prestige on the host state and its leader, though they may pay some political dividend. But those benefits were precisely what the boycotters hoped to deny to Syrian President Bashar al-Asad.

Beyond the desire to protest and even punish Syria for its interference in Lebanon, the sparse attendance was also an additional expression of American policy vis-à-vis Damascus. President Asad and his regime are seen in Washington as central obstacles to the implementation of American policy in the Middle East – because of Syria’s assistance to Hizballah, the fact that it does not prevent the passage of terrorists to Iraq, its activities against the pro-western camp in Lebanon, and, of course, its close alliance with Iran. Against this backdrop, the U.S. has tried to isolate Damascus and deny it regional or international legitimacy. Even the visit of Vice President Dick Cheney to the regional during March may have been aimed, among other things, at persuading Washington’s allies to think again about attending the Summit in Syria.

The recent Summit may be best remembered as the most symbolically expressive manifestation of the division of the Arab world into two camps – a pro-western one led by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and an anti-western one dominated by Iran and Syria and including Hizballah and Hamas. Both are driven by existential concerns. The first fears what King Abdullah of Jordan called “the Shi’ite crescent,” that is, Iranian hegemony. The second fears American hegemony. Divisions, fragmentation, and competing coalitions with pro-western and anti-western orientations are nothing new; they characterize inter-Arab politics since the 1950s. What is new is that Syria, once the “beating heart” of Arab nationalism, may now be gradually making its way outside the Arab camp. Indeed, it seems that the Arab national identity that the regime of Hafez al-Asad worked so hard to cultivate is gradually being replaced by a new identity in which the dominant dimension is Shi’ite. If that is indeed the case, then the alliance between Syrian and Iran may well go far beyond tactical advantage, and the Syrian support for Hizballah and Hamas may represent much more than just a bargaining card in future negotiations with Israel. If so, then the chances that Damascus will agree to cut off ties with its current allies as part of an overall Israeli-Syrian settlement are actually quite remote.

Copyright Institute for National Security Studies