Beyond question, Abu Musab Al Zarqawi was the prince of the cyber-jihad. Until an American air strike killed him last June, he headed the al-Qaeda suicide killers who have spread chaos in Iraq for three years. But on the Internet he stood even taller. He used digital communication so well that it made him a household name in many millions of Muslim households, almost the equal of Osama bin Laden.

Zarqawi realized that the Internet made it possible for a relatively small sect to send propaganda to every corner of the earth. As a result, local jihadi teams everywhere are now joined in a loosely organized but terrifying global network. One of the great triumphs of Western science and capitalism has become the most effective tool of the West's most determined enemies.

In the early days, some jihad warriors saw the Internet as the work of Satan but that notion was soon brushed aside. Most of them wanted to get online, fast. Today, when a new al-Qaeda unit comes together, it must have a leader, a spiritual advisor and a specialist in information technology.

It was Zarqawi, as much as anyone, who made the holy war of the Islamists into history's first digital revolution. Under his direction, no al-Qaeda operation in Iraq went unvideotaped. In the summer of 2005, he put out a 46-minute propaganda video, a gory celebration of death called All Religion Will Be for Allah. Distribution was democratic: Those with broadband connections got the high-definition version, those with only dialup received a smaller file, and cellphone users could also download it.

This is the sort of information that will attract readers to The Secret History of Al- Qaeda (University of California), by Abdel Bari Atwan, the long-time editor of al-Quds al-Arabi, the London paper through which al-Qaeda frequently sends electronic bulletins and threats to the world. A self-described supporter of Western democracy, Atwan condemns attacks on innocent citizens but writes with great sympathy about the al-Qaeda leaders he's met, including bin Laden.

He visited the famous Tora Bora lair in Afghanistan for three days in 1996 and has been talking about it ever since without actually saying much; for instance, bin Laden played basketball and, because he was tallest, always captained his team. He depicts bin Laden as a gentle, understanding, soft-spoken mass murderer.

Atwan seems anxious to dance at everybody's wedding, but maybe he's genuinely conflicted. His account reminds us that in the culture of al-Qaeda, thoughtless rationalization has become routine. For instance, Islamic scripture opposes suicide, but a little imam-shopping will uncover a cleric willing to say it's OK in certain circumstances, such as any circumstances that occur to you. Atwan quotes a radical scholar: "Allah is just. Through his infinite wisdom, he has given the weak what the strong do not possess and that is the ability to turn their bodies into bombs."

Islam also calls upon women to nurture, not fight, but certain imams have decided women and girls commit a holy act when they blow up other people's children as well as themselves. No doubt al-Qaeda's theologians believe in the rules, but it might be hard to find a rule that has not proven malleable when malleability has been convenient.

Rather than delivering the secrets his title promises, Atwan mainly reinforces what we know. He offers detailed proof of the death cult at work in the core of militant Islam. Bin Laden himself expresses much more interest in dying than in living. As he said in 1996, people in the West don't believe it but "we love death even more than they love life."

He's sorry he hasn't been martyred already. So far as anyone can tell, he's not a cynic. He genuinely buys the story about a Paradise awaiting him. Meanwhile, the cyberspace battle goes on. According to Atwan, the world now has some 4,500 jihadist Web sites, many carrying tutorials on breaking into the sites of enemies (Muslim or non-Muslim) to steal information or insert viruses. But the real purpose of most sites is the celebration of martyrdom and the recruitment of Muslims willing to kill themselves.

In Iraq, most suicide attacks are performed by eager volunteers from elsewhere. Once in Iraq they receive so little military training that sometimes they don't even learn how to fire a gun. That's all right with them. They arrive, as Atwan puts it, with "only one aim in mind --martyrdom."

Robert.fulford@utoronto.ca

© National Post 2007