On August 2, 2005, Saudi King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz was laid

to rest in an unmarked grave. Wrapped simply in a brown

robe, his bier borne by family after the briefest of funeral

services, Fahd's end gave no clue to his life. He had been

one of the world's most opulent rulers, his largesse the

stuff of legend. Fahd also possessed powers as monarch that

would have impressed Louis XIV. His reign and his wrestle

with the challenges that threatened his kingdom tell us much

about Saudi Arabia's past, and, perhaps, even more about its

future.

Fahd was born into circumstances unimaginable in his later

life. He was one of over forty sons sired by a desert chief

who married a hundred times. Fahd and his six other

siblings (the Sudari seven) would benefit from their

mother's status as the favorite wife. The future king grew

up in what old-time writers used to call "oriental

splendor," luxurious compared to commoners but primitive

compared to European standards: Plenty of servants but no

indoor plumbing; mobility by donkey, camel, or horse; no

electricity or refrigeration (fresh meat or no meat);

physical prowess prized, especially in combat; sexual

prowess essential.

The state Fahd would inherit did not yet exist. His father,

the legendary Abdul Aziz was then assembling the pieces

through conquest and guile. Warrior and statesman, he had

learned the lesson of the earlier 18th and 19th century

failed Saudi realms. One could rally the warring tribes of

the Arabian peninsula (the Nejd) against the corrupt

Ottomans under the green banner of a purified Salafi (or

Wahabi) Islam but the declining empire still had enough

military might-or could hire it-to ensure defeat. This time

around, the Saudis would work carefully with the strongest

outside power and, instead of confronting it, make it an

ally.

In Fahd's youth, his father's strategy succeeded beyond

expectation. Abdul Aziz managed to switch from the Ottomans

to the British; then in the 1920's, he displaced his rival,

the Hashemite Sharif Hussein of Mecca (whose descendants

still rule Jordan), as London's peninsular ally. This

allowed the Saudis to seize the Red Sea coastline known as

the Hijaz; and on the Persian Gulf, a Shiite-populated area

unknowingly sitting atop a treasure of oil. Chief among his

conquests Abdul Aziz counted Islam's most prized cities,

Mecca and Medina, and the revenue brought by the pilgrims to

their mosques. The holy places were now controlled by the

Wahabi sect, regarded by most other Muslims as extreme.

Gaining a kingdom and holding it were two different things.

When Fahd reached his twenties, his father was preparing

another switch. Although still mindful of the British,

Abdul Aziz already saw the United States as his future ally.

The Americans were developing the oil that was providing

increased revenues. Better still, unlike London, Washington

had no empire and no territorial ambitions. Americans could

help and then they would go home.

On February 14, 1945, President Franklin Roosevelt met the

King aboard an American warship initiating the formal

political association. Roosevelt sought the King's support

for Zionism; the King refused; both agreed to be friends and

that they should consult with each other before taking new

steps. Roosevelt left with some rich presents and, at the

King's request, gave him his reserve wheel chair which

became one of Abdul Aziz's favorite trophies. The visit

overall, complete with live sheep, as FDR wrote his cousin,

had been "a scream."

As a favorite son, Fahd was inducted into the American

connection at an early age. He accompanied his older

brother Faisal to the international conference that founded

America's grand project for post-war peace, the United

Nations. He also got a brief and sweet taste of American

life.

When Abdul Aziz died in 1953, the kingdom went to his eldest

son, Saud. Under his unsteady and inept hand, Saudi Arabia

was nearly lost to the storms of Nasserism and Arab

nationalism. Whereupon, in 1963, he was deposed, the al-

Saud having learned a new lesson: one had to know how to

survive. The ascetic Crown Prince Faisal took matters in

hand.

Faisal guided the realm into a closer association with the

United States, close enough to survive both the 1967 and

1973 wars despite American support for Israel and the oil

embargoes. Common antagonism to Nasser and the Soviet Union

plus economic ties provided the sinews that bound together

two very different countries. And, after 1974, when the

American-sponsored peace process flourished and the

petrodollars gushed, the Saudi situation was transformed.

Both diplomatic pivot and economic mecca, the Kingdom became

a necessary prop to American security. Saudi influence came

to be seen as essential if not always in the political

maneuvering but certainly with respect to the price and

supply of oil.

THE REFORMER

When Fahd came into his first post, Minister of Education in

1953, the general rules of Saudi government were congealing.

First came the importance of holding the family together, a

consensus that began with "l'Etat c'est nous;" no Royal

Family, no state; no unified family, no government. Second

came the blessing from the Ulema, the Salafi clerisy, with

their emphasis on early Islamic practice, public austerity,

male prerogative, female seclusion, and the dangers of

foreign seduction. Third, the blessing of the people to be

secured through an improvement in their conditions of life.

Fourth, the alliance with the strongest external power,

America in this case. And fifth, not taking sides in Arab

disputes-if possible. Instead, the Saudis could conciliate

or consolidate among disputants. These five principles were

the essential duties of Saudi rulers from that day until

this. And it would be Fahd's task to balance them and alter

them when necessary for the sake of the House of Saud's

survival.

Fahd associated himself early with the Kingdom's

modernizers. He is credited with the creation of the

country's public school system including the university

level. Given the haphazard tribal arrangements and general

lack of literacy, this was an expensive and revolutionary

undertaking. The curriculum, however, left largely to the

Ulema, would result in a literacy badly short of both

technical skill and knowledge of the outside world. This

was not so obvious in 1953 but when it did become obvious,

Fahd seemed oblivious to the consequences.

Fahd was also a prime mover in developing the 3-5 year plans

initiated under King Faisal. These plans were intended to

do for Saudi Arabia's economy what education had done for

literacy: equip the Saudi state with the tools to become a

modern technological society without departing from the

religious mores that underpinned its legitimacy. Following

Faisal's murder at the hands of a deranged nephew in 1975,

Fahd became Crown Prince under King Khalid, an older brother

more interested in falconry than government. In reality, it

was a test of the ebullient Fahd's capacity to govern. The

Crown Prince would have to live down his personal reputation

as a reckless womanizer, drinker, and gambler.

In those years, the Arab-Israeli conflict monopolized Saudi

diplomacy. Fahd ranged the Saudis alongside the Carter

Administration's so-called comprehensive approach which

emphasized a consensus of the whole rather than the 1973-

1977 Kissinger era state-by-state negotiation.

Domestically, Fahd began to spend the huge revenues produced

by the rapid rise in oil prices. He launched the breakneck

development of Saudi infrastructure that turned the urban

areas into one vast construction site. Then a series of

unexpected events showed the limits of Saudi power.

In only two years (1978-1980), the consensus approach was

shattered by Sadat and the Camp David Accords; the Shah of

Iran was overthrown by an aggressive Shiite theocrat,

Ayatollah Khomeini; the Soviets seized Afghanistan; and

Moscow's ally, Saddam Hussein, dictator of Iraq, invaded

Iran. Above all, and worst of all, Saudi opponents seized

the Grand Mosque in Mecca on November 20, 1979. After a

bloody, futile effort to secure the Holy place, Fahd had to

call upon the French Special Forces to recover the building.

THE DANGEROUS DECADE

Fahd's reactions to these challenges was multifold. He

would brook no delay in the development program, increasing

spending on the military and raising Saudi Arabia's

"minimum" annual budget to about $55 billion.

Simultaneously, he reinforced the Saudi role as "swing oil

producer," prepared to use its reserve capacity to prevent

prices from damaging the economies of the major oil

consumers, especially the United States. Oil prices and

military procurement brought him powerful allies in

Washington and elsewhere. Saudi Arabia's purchase of AWACS

aircraft in 1981, against strong pro-Israeli opposition in

Congress, was a case study in such influence.

The King also faced a severe religious challenge. There

were internal complaints about lax royal behavior.

Khomeini's Iranian pilgrims disturbed the pilgrimage with

political demonstrations and violence to embarrass the

Wahabi guardians.

Fahd took several fateful decisions. The Saudis would

counter Shii propaganda abroad with Wahabi missionary

activity on a large scale, especially through subsidized

education (the madrasas) in South and Southeast Asia. As

the Saudi economy now relied on large numbers of Pakistani

and other workers, this had the double effect of protecting

against internal subversion. Fahd also began severe

controls over the Haj pilgrims. It would take several

dramatic incidents before the Saudis and the Ayatollah

finally agreed to put the two Mosques outside their quarrel.

Fahd himself marked his new zeal for Islam in 1986 by taking

on the title, "Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques."

As King, Fahd also waged two wars. He swung behind Saddam

in the decade-long battles with Iran, thereby creating a

dependent in Baghdad, or so a reasonable man would have

thought. He encouraged the United States to see in the war

an opportunity to hurt the Iranians and wean Iraq from its

Soviet allies. Another initiative, again through Pakistan,

was the jihad against the Soviet army in Afghanistan. The

Saudis supplied both money and volunteers, the most

notable-and notorious-being Osama bin Laden, scion of the

Royal Family's favorite contractors, the bin Ladens from

Yemen.

Fahd regarded Camp David as a huge mistake and grievously

disappointed the Carter Administration's expectation that

Saudi Arabia would support Sadat's separate peace. While

not formally joining the Rejectionist Front organized by

Saddam, Assad of Syria and Arafat's PLO, the King sought to

undermine the process by reviving the comprehensive, unified

Arab approach. Thus, in August 1981, he launched the Fahd

plan, a set of principles that would grant peace to Israel

contingent on withdrawal to the pre-1967 War lines and the

settlement of the Palestinian refugee problem. After

Sadat's murder on October 6, 1981, the plan seemed to engage

the Europeans but the Reagan Administration sidestepped it.

Fahd saw another chance to promote it when the Israelis

invaded Lebanon in June 1982. In the tangled diplomacy

aimed at extricating Arafat from Beirut, the Saudis played a

delicate role. Khalid died unexpectedly in the middle of

the war and Fahd was crowned King on June 13. During the

condolence visit of American officials, including Vice

President Bush and Secretary of Defense Weinberger, the

Saudi side gained the impression that American policy on the

crisis (dominated heretofore by Secretary of State Haig) was

about to change. Arafat was signaled to wait, collapsing

the negotiations for his departure. He was now in Saudi

debt.

When Haig resigned on June 26, the new King exerted a strong

effort, aided by his half-brother Crown Prince Abdullah, to

turn U.S. policy against the Israelis and back to the

comprehensive approach. But Reagan would not abandon the

Egyptian-Israeli treaty and his own initiative, launched on

September 1, 1982, proved stillborn partly because Fahd's

plan became the basis for the Arab League's subsequent Fez

Declaration, which contradicted it. Worse yet, the new

American Secretary of State George Shultz discovered that

the Saudis could not, or would not, deliver Syria to U.S.-

sponsored negotiations over withdrawal from Lebanon. For

the rest of the decade, the United States was loath to touch

either issue, especially after the Marine disaster in 1983

at Beirut Airport.

Fahd eventually returned to the Lebanon problem, brokering a

deal called the Taif Accords in 1989. These confirmed

Syria's domination of the country and changed Lebanon's

constitution to allow a larger Muslim role vis--vis the

previously dominant Christians. Put in place as Prime

Minister to guarantee the Saudi interest while rebuilding

the country was Rafik Hariri, a Lebanese subcontractor grown

rich in the Saudi construction boom and therefore by

definition a business associate of the Royal Family.

SUCCESS AND CRISIS

After a decade of these exertions, Fahd's Saudi Arabia

appeared to enter the nineties a good deal more secure than

the eighties. The Kingdom could take some satisfaction from

the failure of Khomeini's Iran to expand more than its

Hizbollah outpost in southern Lebanon; the Iranians had also

been outflanked in South and Southeast Asia; and the Soviets

driven from Afghanistan, on their way to oblivion.

Meanwhile, the Palestinian intifada (1987) revived American

interest in diplomacy while shaking Israeli confidence.

Lebanon was rebuilding, and oil prices were steady.

But Fahd's reign was not destined for repose. The

"dependent" in Baghdad, Saddam, opened a gratuitous quarrel

with Kuwait over war debts and oil revenues. The King

offered mediation. Joining President Mubarak of Egypt and

King Hussein of Jordan, Fahd urged President George Bush to

stay low. An "Arab solution" would be found. On July 31,

under Saudi auspices, the Iraqis and Kuwaitis met to find

one.

Two days later, Saddam seized Kuwait.

Would Saudi Arabia be next? Saddam offered assurances but

his troops were on the offensive and there was nothing to

stop them except the Saudi's own forces. Moreover, the King

had offered refuge to the Emir of Kuwait and his family who

had barely escaped Saddam's men.

Saudi Arabia's ultimate defense had always been what was

called the "over the horizon" deterrent. The Americans (and

others) presumably would not allow Saudi Arabia to be

overrun by hostile powers. After the Shah's fall, President

Carter proclaimed the defense of the Gulf to be in America's

vital interest. But the forces to do so had never been

stationed on Saudi ground. There were only training

missions and temporary technicians.

We have American accounts of the critical meeting on August

6, 1990, when a U.S. delegation offered American troops to

defend Saudi Arabia and ultimately to reclaim Kuwait. The

King and the Crown Prince seemed at odds, with Abdullah

exclaiming that Kuwait, although occupied, was still there,

the implication being that some combination of threat and

bribe might force Saddam out. But Fahd had been double-

crossed. And if Saddam wanted money, he could have gotten

it through negotiation. As for Kuwait, the King archly

observed that "Kuwait"-meaning the Royal Family-was then

living in Saudi hotels. For a Saudi ruler, the affairs of

state were always personal.

Fahd welcomed the Americans to defend the Kingdom, and urged

them to evict Saddam. In Washington this produced the

interesting spectacle of Prince Bandar joining with the

American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)-the main

opposition to the AWACS sale ten years earlier-to lobby

congressional support for the war.

Fahd's policy toward Iraq was complex. He opposed the

breakup of the country or the breakdown of the Sunni-

dominated regime. But he did want Saddam eliminated. To do

otherwise would be to leave a man thirsting for revenge.

The Americans, however, failed to do so. And this time they

could not go home lest Saddam be tempted to strike again.

The U.S. presence carried a steep price. Saudi critics

could charge that there were now armed infidels in the land

of the two mosques. Many Saudis could not understand why it

was necessary, or why the hyper-expensive Saudi military

could not defend the Kingdom.

In the war's aftermath, pressure mounted for political

change. Some of it Fahd could deflect. He had been a

modernizer in his day. He would reform once more,

introducing a new Basic Law in 1992 to govern the

succession, reviving the moribund Consultative Council and

changing rules for provincial governors and ministers.

Some, however, could not be persuaded of change. Osama bin

Laden concluded that the Royal Family were infidels in

disguise. His preachments earned him expulsion and then the

loss of citizenship. There are still unexplained parts of

the Osama-Saudi connection, especially about his move to

Afghanistan, but that would carry us beyond the Fahd story.

REIGN, NOT RULE

On November 29, 1995, the King was felled by a massive

stroke. A year later, it became clear that he would never

recover his former vitality. Crown Prince Abdullah, a

figure reminiscent of Faisal, became the de factor ruler.

Fahd's reign would last another decade. The Royal Bulletins

pretended that his routine continued. Occasionally, he

would be turned out to greet important visitors, a few words

exchanged, photographs snapped, his bulky figure shrinking

over the years.

The King always had his detractors. A true royalist, he

never let government interfere with his schedule. He made

up for tardiness through sudden marathon bouts of work, to

the consternation of the otherwise inert Saudi bureaucracy.

Fahd's palace mania, including a never occupied replica of

the White House, was extravagant even by Gulf standards.

The King had never been careful with money and his

development program did not prepare his people for a future

without oil, or for that matter, a present with a low oil

price. Construction and war ate up the surplus and even

current revenues will not resolve the problems of a rapidly

growing but idle population, its work and bills paid by

someone else.

Fahd proved a fallible judge of character. Saddam betrayed

him; so did Arafat who refused urgent Saudi advice in 2000

to settle his conflict with Israel. He made an even more

serious miscalculation through indulgence of Wahabi

extremism, which hit America with a vengeance on 9/11 and

then two years later, came home through violent rebellion in

Saudi Arabia itself. The U.S.-Saudi alliance, his most

cherished international relationship, nurtured so well for

so long by his flamboyant nephew, Prince Bandar, was fraying

just when both sides most needed each other.

Still, Fahd's record needs perspective. Born when the

Kingdom was but a gleam in his father's eyes, bred to

rapidly expanding wealth and power, he took his country

successfully through an extraordinary series of life-

threatening events, of the kind never seen by his

predecessors. Profligate though he may have been, Fahd

never forgot that Saudi Arabia was a rich place with a small

army in a region full of ghastly predators. He proved

forceful even with a weak hand. Fahd was a king.

Fahd's methods and his legacy can only go so far. His

notions of reform clearly belong to an earlier era. The

religious, political, economic, and military pressures

bearing down on his successor demand change at a more rapid

pace than the infamous inchmanship beloved of the al-Saud.

Fahd's half-brother, now King Abdullah, prayed on his

coronation for "strength to continue the march begun by the

founder of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the great Abdul Aziz

al-Saud." Abdullah's march, however, must be to a markedly

different beat than Fahd's if the Kingdom is to survive.